

An exploration of executive compensation in Croatia - what are its implications within corporate governance?

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Introduction



- Executive directors influence firm performance (Chingos et al., 2004.)
- How to structure executives' compensation package?
- The importance of compensation setting processes
- Open issues in executive compensation
- Agency theory as the basis for executive compensation


Executive compensation in transition

Table 1: Description of senior executive compensation in transition economies

Slovenia Bulgaria		Czech Republic	Slovakia	
•Ratio senior executive pay	•During 1995 the annual	•CEOs earn 60-80% more	•CEOs earn 30-40% more	
to employee pay: 5,8	CEO compensation was	than executives at the	than executives at the	
(Slapničar et. al., 2005)	about 3,07 times the average	next level of the	next level of the	
•Bonus to total compensation	workers wage (Jones&Kato,	hierarchy in the firm	hierarchy in the firm	
of senior executives: 15%	1995)	(Eriksson, 2005)	(Eriksson, 2005)	
(Slapničar et. al., 2005)	(Slapničar et. al., 2005) •The only performance		•Ownership structure	
•In about 25% of the sampled	variable which is found to	own firms obtain the	affects executive	
companies the second	influence changes in CEO	same pay as in privately	compensation (Eriksson,	
performance-contingent part	pay is total assets	owned firms (Eriksson,	2005)	
of compensation is	(sensitivity of 0,00004)	2005)		
managerial profit sharing	(Jones & Kato, 1996)	• statistically significant		
•Stronger ownership		and a positive		
concentration does not bring		relationship between the		
to a stronger link between		changes in pay and		
pay and performance		change is corporate		
(Slapničar et. al., 2005)		performance measured in		
		profit/sales (Eriksson,		
		2005)		

Methodology of research





 \checkmark Response rate: 18,44% (22,33% including in-depth interviews)


✓ Research time line: single research, December 2010-February 2011

Executive compensation in Croatia (1)

• Ownership structure of sampled firms:

Ownership indicator	Mean
Ownership amount of top block holder	55,23%
Ownership concentration (5 major owners)	79,93%
Ownership concentration (10 top owners)	85,75%
State owned	10,80%
Owned by institutional investors	14,52%
Owned by foreigners	12,10%


The use of variable compensation among sampled firms:



Executive compensation in Croatia (2)

Figure 1: Relative amounts of fixed and variable compensation

Figure 2: The use of equity based compensation



Executive compensation in Croatia (3) = 1920 - 2010

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of executive compensation in Croatian firms

	% of total compensation in 2009				
	Fixed compensation (base pay)	Variable compensation	Cash bonus	Equity based compensation	
Average	82,92	17,08	13,34	3,47	
Median	80,00	20,00	12,50	,00	
Std. dev.	14,026	14,026	12,600	10,547	
Variance	196,723	196,723	158,772	111,229	
Minimum	43	0	0	0	
Maximum	100	57	50	57	

Executive compensation in Croatia (4)

Table 3: Correlation coefficients among relative amounts of compensationcomponents and performance indicators

(% of total compensation in 2009		EPS	ROA	ROE	ROS	Net profit
	Fixed compensation (base pay)	Corr. coef.	-,289*	-,253	-,316*	-,295*	-,399**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,078	,126	,053	,073	,013
man's rho	Variable compensation	Corr. coef.	,289*	,253	,316*	,295*	,399**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,078	,126	,053	,073	,013
	Cash bonus	Corr. coef.	,034	,073	,067	,154	,227
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,839	,663	,688	,356	,171
Spearman	Equity based compensation	Corr. coef.	,167	,116	,136	,142	,116
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,317	,490	,417	,396	,490

*p<0,1, **p<0,05, ***p<0,01

Executive compensation in Croatia (5)

Table 4: The ratio of executive pay to average firm pay

Pay ratio	Percent (%)	Cumulative Percent (%)
2:1	18,4	18,4
4:1	31,6	50,0
6:1	21,1	71,1
8:1	18,4	89,5
10 or more :1	10,5	100,0
Total	100,0	

Discussion



- How to explore and research executive compensation in transition economies?
- Is there any path of convergence among executive compensation in transition economies?
- Can we apply existing knowledge on executive compensation to transition economies and countries with continental system of governance?
- What role(s) does executive compensation take in transition economies?
- What to do about executive compensation in state-owned firms?

Conclusions



- Executive compensation is accepted mechanism of corporate governance but how about executive compensation within continental system of corporate governance
- The role of executive compensation in Croatia is defined by firm ownership structure
- Executive compensation versus internal monitoring?
- The importance of executive compensation for firm performance



Thank you for your attention

Q&A